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(Short Notes on gotra Theory
in YogƗcƗra Buddhism)
Vladimir Korobov 
Centre of Oriental Studies, Vilnius University 
The article continues discussion on ontological entities in YogƗcƗra Buddhism, 
originally initiated by Matsumoto Shirǀ and Hakamaya Noriaki. Analyzing 
teachings presented within the frameworks of YogƗcƗra school of Buddhism, some 
modern Buddhologists find there traces of ontology which originally conflicts with 
basic Buddhist doctrines of no-self and dependent arising. According to the position 
of these Buddhologists, such concepts as gotra and tathƗgatagarbha represent a 
“generative monism” or a “foundational realism” in YogƗcƗra Buddhism. The 
author of the article argues that all the attempts to find an ontological basis for 
enlightenment are no more than efforts to place Buddhist practical epistemology 
into the limits of Western philosophy.
A. Although the very term gotra (rigs) in YogƗcƗra Buddhism does not seem 
difficult to understand and interprete and lately there have appeared several papers 
where this term was discussed in detail,1 in the light of the polemic on “Critical 
Buddhism” I feel the need to discuss this term once again. 
“Critical Buddhism” is a neologism invented by Hakamaya Noriaki, Professor at 
Komazawa Junior College and author of The Hermeneutics of VijñƗptimƗtratƗ
(Shunjǌsha, 1994), An Annotated Translation of MahƗyƗnasǌtrƗlaükƗra (co-translator, 
Daizǀ Shuppan, 1993), and other writings. In a series of articles2 he and his colleague 
Matsumoto Shirǀ, Professor in the Faculty of Buddhism at Kamazawa University, 
____________
1
 See, for example, D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Meaning of the Term “Gotra” and the Textual History 
of the Ratnagotravibhaga”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, 2 (1976): 
341–63. Useful materials for understanding of the “gotra” term may be found in James Apple, 
“Twenty Varieties of the Saïgha: A Typology of Noble Beings (Ɨrya) in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism”, 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 503–92; 32 (2004): 211–79. See also John J. Makransky, 
Buddhahood Embodied: Sources and Controversy in India and Tibet, New York, 1997.  
2
 See collection of critical essays by Hakamaya Noriaki Hongaku shisǀ hihan [Critiques of the 
doctrine of original enlightenment] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989), Hihan Bukkyǀ [Critical 
Buddhism] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1990). See also critical essays written by Matsumoto Shiro and 
collected in Zen shisǀ no hihanteki kenkyǌ [Critical studieson Zen Thought] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 
1993), Engi to kǌ: Nyoraizǀ shisǀ hihan [PratƯtyasamutpƗda and emptiness: Critiques of the doctrine 
of tathƗgata-garbha] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989).
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made a distinction between “not true” Buddhism which is based on monism and 
positive ontology and “true” Buddhism based on the doctrines of no-self and dependent 
arising (pratƯtyasamutpƗda) only.3
According to Matsumoto, dhƗtu and gotra theories in MahƗyƗnasǌtrƗlaükƗra,
MahƗparinirvƗna Sǌtra, Bodhisattvabhǌmi and AbhisamayƗlaükƗra represent 
monistic tendencies in Buddhism and cause social discrimination “ultimately affirming 
the differences of an actual phenomenon (dharma) and spiritual lineages (gotras)
among people”. 4  To describe this phenomenon, Matsumoto have introduced the 
dhƗtu-vƗda concept. DhƗtu-vƗda, or the “theory of locus” has according to Matsumoto 
the following defining characteristics: 
“1. ‘Locus’ is the basis for ‘super-loci’. 
2. ‘Locus’ gives rise to ‘super-loci’. 
3. ‘Locus’ is one, ‘super-loci’ are many. 
4. ‘Locus’ is real, ‘super-loci’ are not real. 
5. ‘Locus’ is the essential nature (atman) of “super-loci’. 
6. ‘Super-loci’ are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen 
from the ‘locus’ and share its nature”.5 Summarizing, Matsumoto writes: “[…] the 
basic structure of dhƗtu-vƗda is that of a singular, real locus (dhƗtu) that gives rise to a 
plurality of phenomena. We may also speak of it as a ‘generative monism’ or a 
‘foundational realism’”. 6  Setting apart the obvious Platonic complexion of these 
defining characteristics, let us take a close look at what is called gotra.
B. In his analysis of the text of RatnagotravibhƗga Ruegg writes: “The word gotra
is frequently used in the literature of MahƗyƗna Buddhism to denote categories of 
persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The 
chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up 
the ĞrƗvaka-gotra, the Individual Buddhas making p the pratyekabuddha-gotra, and 
the Bodhisattvas making up the bodhisattva-gotra. In the Saüdhinirmocanasǌtra these 
three types constitute altogether different gotras, which thus coincide with the three 
separate Vehicles (yƗnas) as recognized by YogƗcƗrin / VijñaptimƗtratƗ school. To 
these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (aniyatagotra),
which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three proceeding 
classes; and the non-gotra (agotra), that is the category made up of persons who cannot 
____________
3
 Matsumoto Shiro: “I choose to believe […] that Buddhism is the teaching of dependent arising, 
and there is no “awakening” or “enlightenment” other than reflecting on or considering (manasikƗra)
dependent arising. If this is true, then it is clear that any “Zen thought” that teaches “cessation of 
thinking” (amanasikƗra, asamjñƗ) is anti-Buddhist” (“The Meaning of Zen”, in Pruning the Bodhi 
Tree: The storm over critical Buddhism, Honolulu, 1997, 250). 
4
 Matsumoto Shiro, “TathƗgata-Garbha is not Buddhist”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 172. 
5
 Ibid., 170. 
6
 Ibid., 171. 
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be assigned to any spiritual class. Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of 
persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in 
accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaching the Awakening 
(bodhi) characteristic of the ĝrƗvaka and so on. Especially remarkable in this 
connection, and somewhat anomalous as gotra, is non-gotra, i.e. that category of 
persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain YogƗcƗrin authorities, as 
spiritual ‘outcastes’ lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening 
of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither bodhi nor nirvƗõa, they represent the 
same type as icchantikas to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this 
capacity”.7
He also suggests two ways of understanding the term gotra:
The word gotra thus either designates extensionally a (soteriological and gnoseological) 
category or class; or it designates intensionally the factor or capacity that determines 
classification in such a category or class. In these meanings the term gotra is evidently 
related to the concept of a lineage, clan, or family, or of a genus; and its meanings are 
associated with a socio-biological metaphor (gotra = kula, vaüĞa ‘family’, etc.) and a 
biological or botanical metaphor (gotra = bƯja, ‘seed, germ’).8
Saüdhinirmocanasǌtra in connection with the spiritual element of living beings 
(sattva-dhƗtu) speaks of three different classes: nyan thos kyi theg pa’i rigs can
(ĞrƗvaka-yƗna-gotraka) – “those who are of the Hearers’ lineage”, rang sang rgyas kyi 
theg pa’i rigs can (pratyekabuddha-yƗna-gotraka) – “those who are in the lineage of 
Solitary Realizers (Individual Buddhas) and de bzhin gshegs pa’i rigs can
(tathƗgata-gotraka) – “those who are in the lineage of TathƗgata”.
In LaïkƗvatƗrasǌtra two additional categories are included: aniyata-gotra “those 
whose lineage is undetermined” and a-gotra – “persons who are of no lineage at all”.9
In KƗĞyapaparivarta Ɨrya-gotra (‘phag pa’i rigs) is mentioned. It is stainless 
(vimala), real (satya), indestructible (akùaya) and permanent (nitya). It is anƗtman and 
doesn’t belong to an object (anupalambha). 10  In Gotra Chapter of MahƗyƗna- 
sǌtrƗlaükƗra 3.2 this term is described as follows: “Existence of gotra is ascertained in 
the diversity of dhƗtu, of freedom, of knowledge, of obtainment of fruits.
____________
7
 D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Meaning of the Term ‘Gotra’ and the Textual History of the 
RatnagotravibhƗga”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, 2 (1976): 341. 
8
 Ibid., 341–42. 
9
 See David Seyfort Ruegg, La Théorie du TathƗgatagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la 
Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme, Publications de l’École Francaise d’Extréme-Orient 
LXX, Paris, 1969, 73. The very term gotra Ruegg translates as “lignée spirituelle”. It is remarkable 
that L. Schmithausen translates this term by the German “Heilsanlage” (see his Der
NirvƗõa-Abschnitt in der ViniĞcayasaügrahaõƯ der YogƗcƗrabhǌmiþ, Wien, 1969), while Gustav 
Roth translates it as “innate spiritual predisposition” (see his article “Observations on the First 
Chapter of Asaïga’s Bodhisattvabhǌmi”, Indologica Taurinensia 3–4 (1975–76): 403–12).
10
 Ibid., 109–15. 
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Commentary:
By reason of the multiplicity of the dhƗtu of beings, the classification of dhƗtu does 
not have a limit; as is said in the AkùarƗĞi sǌtra. After admitting that the diversion of 
dhƗtu is based on similar knowledge, the result of the gotra is diverse in the three 
vehicles (yƗnƗs). The diversity of the illumination is ascertained in the beings. At first 
such and such a belief in such and such a yƗna brings illumination; hence it cannot be 
produced without the diversity of gotra. When illumination is provoked by an 
experience, one ascertains the diversity of the knowledge, one advances, one does not 
advance; it is not produced without the diversity of the gotra. The diversity of a fruit is 
also ascertained; the illumination is inferior, mediocre or superior; it is not produced 
without diversity of gotra as the fruit corresponds to the seed”.11
In gotra-pañala of Bodhisattvabhǌmi gotra together with the primary cultivation of 
an enlightened attitude (dang po sems bskyed) and a range of conductive aspects of 
enlightenment (byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad) make up the “ground” 
(gzhi).12 The following definition of gotra is suggested: 
De la ni rigs gang zhe na/ mdor na rnam pa gnyis te/ ran bzhin gyis gnas pa dang/ yang dag 
par bsgrubs pa’o/ de la ran bzhin gyis gnas pa’i rigs ni byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi skye 
mched drug gi khyad par gang yin pa ste/ de ni gcig nas gcig tu brgyud de ‘ongs pa thog ma 
med pa’i dus can chos nyid kyis thob pa de lta bu yin no/ de la yang dag par bsgrubs pa’i rigs 
ni sngon dge ba’i rtsa ba goms par byas pa las thob pa gang yin pa ste/ don gyi skabs ‘dir ni 
rnam pa gnyi ga yang ‘dod do/ rigs de ni sa bon zhes kyang bya/ khams de ni rang bzhin zhes 
kyang bya’o/
“What is gotra? Briefly, there are two divisions [of gotra]. One existing naturally 
and [the other] attained. The naturally existing gotra is a specific state of the six sense 
bases (ayatana) of bodhisattvas. [This state] is successively transmitted from the 
beginningless past [to the present] and is similar to the possession of dharmata (chos
nyid). The attained gotra is a possession of roots of virtuous deeds [accomplished] in 
former [lives]. Both divisions [of gotra] are asserted here [with reference] to the 
preliminary context. The gotra is also called ‘potentiality’ (sa bon) and the dhƗtu
(khams) in turn is called ‘self-nature’ (rang bzhin)”.13
Further in the rigs Chapter of Bodhisattvabhǌmi there are discussed differences 
between gotras and the superiority of the bodhisattvas’ gotra is established. Regarding 
two hindrances – afflictive hindrance (nyon mong pa’i sgrib pa, kleĞƗvarana) and 
intellectual hindrance (shes bya’i sgrib pa, jñeyƗvarana) – Ğravakas (nyan thos) and 
pratyekabuddhas (rang sangs rgyas) are able to get rid of the first only, whereas 
____________
11 MahƗyƗnasǌtrƗlaükƗra by Asanga, ed. and trans. Surekha Vijay Limaye, Bibliotheca 
Indo-Buddhica Series 94, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992, 34. 
12
 “De la gzhi gang zhe na/ ‘di la byang chub sems dpa’i rang gi rigs dang/ dang po sems bskyed 
pa dang/ byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad ni gzhi zhes bya’o” from Byang chub semsm pa’i 
sa//mdzad pa po/’phags pa thogs med/, Taipei, 2003, 1.
13 Byang chub semsm pa’i sa//mdzad pa po/’phags pa thogs med/, Taibei, 2003, 2–3. 
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bodhisattvas (byang chub sems dpa) dispose of the both and on the score of this they 
are called unexcelled superiors (khyad par du ‘phags pa bla na med pa).
Then bodhisattvas’ advantages over Ğravakas and pratyekabuddhas are established 
in connection with four aspects: 1) as resulting from power (dbang po las gyur pa) – 
bodhisattva naturally has the highest powers (rang bzhin gyis dbang po rno ba yin);
2) as resulting from practical benefits (sgrub pa las gyur pa) – bodhisattva acts and 
lives for the benefit of others; 3) as resulting from discernmental skills (mkhas pa las 
gyur pa) – bodhisattva knows more and is experienced in other sciences than Ğravakas
and pratyekabuddhas, (rig pa’i gnas gzhan thams cad la yang mkhas par byed), and  
4) as resulting from the outcome (‘bras bu las gyur pa) – bodhisattva attains the fruit of 
the highest, pure and perfect enlightenment (bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i 
byang chub).14
C. As we can see from the texts of MahƗyƗnasǌtrƗlaükƗra and Bodhisattvabhǌmi, 
there is established an evident differentiation between bothisattvas’ and other gotras.
The question is: what is the basis of this differentiation?
Matsumoto’s answer obviously implies a Plato-like model of ontology: “[…] I find 
Yogacara theory of gotra to be based on monism […]”.15 And Hakamaya writes: “The 
mind cannot be separate from its thoughts which constantly arise and perish, but if there 
is an “origin of the mind” behind the mind, then this can be identified as an eternal and 
unchanging “thusness” (Skt. tathatƗ, Jpn. shinnyo) that sustains all phenomena”.16
The issue of differentiation between gotras is brought up in AbhisamayƗlaükƗra
1.39:
Since there are no any distinctions in dharmadhƗtu, then the differentiation among gotras
isn’t tenable. [But because] of dependency dharmas have [their] peculiarities. That is why 
the classification [of gotras] is proclaimed.17
____________
14
 Ibid., 3–4. 
15
 I would like to make some notes on Matsumoto’s translation of rang bzhin gyis gnas pa as ‘[the 
gotra] located on prakçti’. In his response to the critical article written by Yamabe Nobuyoshi (see 
“Critical Exchange on the Idea of DhƗtu-vƗda”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 206) he argued that 
traditional translation of this phrase as ‘[the gotra] existing by nature’ or ‘naturally existing [gotra]’ is 
a fault and we should translate it as it was mentioned above – ‘[the gotra] located on prakçti’ or ‘[the 
gotra] existing on prakçti’. It should be stated that it is hardly possible for the same phrase to have a 
different lexical meaning within one short segment of text. The phrase rang bzhin gyis appears at least 
twice at the same page of the Gotra Chapter of Bodhisattvabhǌmi: rang bzhin gyis dbang po and rang
bzhin gyis sbyin pa. The translation is obvious: ‘naturally’; ‘naturally [has] powers’ and ‘natural 
generosity’. The same method of translation must be applied also to the phrase rang bzhin gyis gnas 
pa – ‘naturally abides’ or ‘[is] presented naturally’.
16
 Hakamaya Noriaki, Hongaku shisǀ hihan [Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment], 
Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989, 5. 
17
 “chos kyi dbyings la dbyer med phyir/rigs ni tha dad rung ma yin/brten pa’i chos kyi bye brag 
gis/de yi dbye ba yongs su brjod//”, from AbhisamayƗlaükƗra-PrajñƗpƗramitƗ-UpadeĞa-ĝƗstra, The 
work of Bodhisattva Maitreya, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, St. Petersburg, 1929. 
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Commenting on this fragment, mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang writes:
In this case, the basis for the perception (dmigs rten), [that is, the object,] is called the basis
(rten). It is not [a distinction between the] “basis (rten) and what is a based [or dependent = 
brten pa] phenomenon” in the sense of “what is caused and the cause” [but instead in the 
sense of the “object perceived and the perceiver”]. Therefore, even though the division of the 
Ɨryan beings of the three vehicles into different lineages is not made in regard to reality qua 
the perceived basis or perceived object (dmigs yul) of their respective gnoses [as these are all 
identical, in each case being reality], the division into the three lineages of the three vehicles 
is made with regard to reality in so far as the three gnoses, which are the dependent 
[phenomena, i. e. “based” = brten pa], the perceivers that take reality as their object. When 
meditated on, these act as the causes of the different Ɨryan states, hence the division into 
three lineages. This is the meaning.18
As we can clearly see, differentiation between gotras is presented here as an 
epistemological and not an ontological problem. References to different abstract 
entities (tathatƗ, dharmadhƗtu, tathƗgatagarbha, etc.) in Buddhist texts do not 
necessarily imply an ontological background. Gotra gradation corresponds to different 
levels of involvement into the understanding of thatness and in that way speaks about 
self-awareness irrespective of any “locus”. The level of involvement depends on the 
personal will, attempts and cognitive situation but not on any a priori given 
metaphysical support. Moreover, this gradation corresponds to the path (lam), i.e. all 
gotra categories are not ascertained once and for all, because knowledge and awareness 
themselves all the time are in progress. Pro tanto the background for gotra gradation 
may be understood in terms of the Aristotelian teaching on İȞĲİȜȑȤİȚĮ which is a union 
of the final goal and result. On the one hand, it is possible to understand İȞĲİȜȑȤİȚĮ as 
‘assiduity’, because a goal requires some attempts to reach it (as in the case of ‘attained 
gotra’ – dag par bsgrubs pa’i rigs). On the other hand, it already potentially presents as 
a result (as in the case with ‘naturally existing gotra’ – ran bzhin gyis gnas pa’i rigs).
Both they formally (with no regard to the Aristotelian theory of soul) compose the 
background which may be called tathƗgatagarbha – embryo-essence, a spiritual germ 
(gotrata1) or generative matrix, the cause and the goal. As the union of the goal and 
result, İȞĲİȜȑȤİȚĮ is not an ontological entity, it is an inner power, and a person may be 
aware of this power and concerned with it in different ways. In this connection, I 
remember the theory of consciousness presented by Kierkegaard in his Sickness Unto 
Death. According to this theory, we all have consciousness to different degrees: “The 
more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more 
will, the more self. A person who has no will at all is no self, but the more will he has, 
the more consciousness of self he has also”. 19  This disposition described by 
____________
18 A Dose of Emptiness, An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dge 
legs dpal bzang by José Ignacio Cabezón, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 125, Delhi, 1993, 221.
19
 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie, 
Princeton, 1968, 162. 
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Kierkegaard resembles the structure of gotras, particularly in case of a-gotraþ persons 
who have no will accordingly have no consciousness and hence cannot aspire to 
enlightenment.
D. It seems to me that Buddhism in general and YogƗcƗra Buddhism in particular 
builds its epistemology on the basis of self-awareness and existential responsibility 
rather than on admission of Absolute Reality that denudes a person of the option and 
designates strata for different living beings. Dan Lusthaus says: “Gotra, which means 
‘family’ or line of descent, has since the earliest Buddhist texts been used to counter 
caste-consciousness by means of substituting a functional meaning for the term rather 
than an essential or ontological meaning. Simply, one is what one does (karmaka),
rather than what one claims to be (ƗtmanƗ)”.20 mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang writes:
“[…] we are thinking of a lineage during the time [that person is on] the path [and not 
something possessed by all beings]”. 21  And ƖcƗrya Haribhadra commenting 
AbhisamayƗlaükƗra 1.39 in his AbhisamayƗlaükaravçttiþ spuñarthƗ writes: “If pure 
dharmadhƗtu is a cause of the realization of Ɨrya qualities (‘phags pa’i chos rtogs par 
‘gyur ba’i rgyu), then those [possessing this cause] supreme bodhisattvas automatically 
(de bzhin du) may be reckoned among the lineage of the highest enlightenment. 
However, as regards the affiliation (gnas pa) with [this lineage], such pure (ideal, kho
na) bodhisattvas do not exist […]. Likewise it is perceived in the stages of the Ğravaka
vehicle, for the purpose of realization of Ɨrya qualities, dharmadhƗtu is considered as 
being existential cause. From this point of view the lineages are designated”. He 
continues with an illustration: “Just as in pots witch are made from the same clay and 
burnt on the same fire may be stored both honey and sugar, the same way the three 
vehicles in which dharma is stored must be recognized to be different”.22
So, it seems to me that concerning gotra, it is useful to take into account that: 
1) the classification of three types of Ɨrya beings has an epistemological and not an 
ontological ground. TathƗgatagarbha being a goal and a cause concurrently is 
an epistemological entity. Suffice it to say that in the first chapters of 
AbhisamayƗlaükƗra three types of Ɨrya being are described on the grounds of 
three types of knowledge: sarvƗkƗra jñatƗ (rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid)
– total omniscience of Buddhas, mƗrga jñatƗ (lam shes nyid) – knowledge of the 
path peculiar to bodhisattvas, and sarva jñatƗ (thams cad shes pa nyid) – 
all-knowledge, conforming to the state of ĞrƗvaka and pratyekabuddha Ɨrya. In 
all the above texts, classification of Ɨrya beings is discussed in terms of 
____________
20
 Dan Lusthaus, “Returning to the Sources”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 48. 
21 A Dose of Emptiness, An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dge 
legs dpal bzang by José Ignacio Cabezón, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 125, Delhi, 1993, 222.
22 AbhisamayƗlaükaravçttiþ spuñarthƗ by ƖcƗrya Haribhadra, restored and ed. Ramshankar 
Tripathi, Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1993, 32 (of Tibetan text).  
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knowledge, realization and cognition (rtogs pa, shes pa). There is no any trace of 
ontology or monism here;
2) besides, it is necessary to take into account that all the terms that provoke looking 
for ontology in Buddhism (tathatƗ, tathƗgatagarbha, svabhava, etc.) are related 
to the path and not used generally. All these concepts are useful not on their own 
as metaphysical or ontological concepts, but simply as handy practical models. 
All the attempts to find ontology in Buddhism are nothing but a try to insert dharma 
into Western intellectual paradigms. Finally it becomes clear that it is impossible. 
Fortunately, there are things that are incompatible. 
I would like to conclude these short notes with the words of recently passed away 
Professor Herbert V. Guenther who devoted all his life to analysis and interpretation of 
Tibetan texts: “[…] the use of Western categories in connection with Eastern patterns 
of thought is extremely misleading and in most cases reveals a considerable lack of 
understanding on the part of him who uses these categories”.23
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